

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DHA-05 CU-04 BIB-01 ACDA-12 TRSE-00

OMB-01 EB-08 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /092 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3260

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION USNATO

USMISSION BERLIN

USCINCEUR

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BELGRADE 7613

FOR EUR/SOV, EUR/RPM AND ACDA FROM USDEL CSCE

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, OCON

SUBJ: BELGRADE CSCE -- ROMANIAN PROPOSAL ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF
SECURITY

REF: A) BELGRADE 7307; B) USNATO 9345; C) STATE 254101

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1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS
WITH MEMBERS OF US DELEGATION, ROMANIANS HAVE
STRESSED THAT THEIR PROPOSAL ON MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES
(REF A), CIRCULATED IN THE SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY ON
SECURITY LAST WEEK, IS GENUINELY THEIR OWN AND THAT THE
MEASURES IT EMBODIES ARE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE ROMANIAN

SECURITY. REALISTICALLY, THEY CANNOT HOPE THAT ANY SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE PROPOSAL WILL BE ADOPTED BY THE MEETING: MILITARY REP ON ROMANIAN DELEGATION (APOSTO) HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY WOULD BE HAPPY IF ONLY ONE OF ITS ELEMENTS WERE AGREED TO. THE PROPOSAL ITSELF CONTAINS MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE REASSURING TO SMALLER COUNTRIES AND ARE NOT OBVIOUSLY SKEWED TO FAVOR ONE ALLIANCE OR THE OTHER. AT THE SAME TIME, ALL BUT ONE OF THE MEASURES ARE EITHER OUT OF PLACE AT BELGRADE OR UN-ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. IN INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH ROMANIANS WE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THAT WE SEE NO PROSPECT OF BEING ABLE TO SUPPORT MEASURES ON ANY OF THE SPECIFIC SUBJECTS INCLUDED IN THEIR PROPOSAL EXCEPT PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AT SAME TIME WE REGARD ROMANIAN PROPOSAL AS WELCOME ASSERTAION OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE, IN CONTEXT OF CSCE, FROM MOSCOW. IN ADDRESSING IT IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE PROPOSAL AS A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTION TO CONSIDERATION OF MILITARY SECURITY IN EUROPE WHILE AT SAME TIME CLEARLY STATING OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH ITS SPECIFIC ELEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. DELEGATION'S DETAILED COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF ROMANIAN PROPOSAL FOLLOW. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PROVIDE, IN PARTICULAR EARLY COMMENTS UPON AND CONFIDENTIAL

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ADDITIONS TO ARGUMENTS OUTLINED IN PARAS 5C AND 5D BELOW. DISCUSSION OF NEW CBM PROPOSALS, INCLUDING THE ROMANIAN, MAY BEGIN IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY ON SECURITY AS EARLY AS MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK.

3. THE ROMANIAN PROPOSAL IS DIVIDED INTO TWO SECTIONS. THE FIRST IS A GENERAL STATEMENT ABOUT THE ARMS RACE, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. THE SECOND WOULD ESTABLISH SEVERAL SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY. THESE OBLIGATIONS ARE OF TWO KINDS: THE FIRST TWO INVOLVE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY PARTICIPATING STATES; THE LAST THREE ENTAIL RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT ACTIVITIES MAY BE UNDERTAKEN.

4. SECTION I, DISARMAMENT.

A. ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THE CONTENT SEEMS UNEXCEPTIONABLE, THE LENGHT OF THE ROMANIAN TEXT IS OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE LENGHT OF THE TEXT ON DISARMAMENT IN THE FINAL ACT. IN SUBSTANCE, WHAT IT DOES IS TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE ARMS RACE IN EUROPE, COMMIT STATES TO TRY HARDER TO REDUCE CONFRONTATION

AND LIMIT ARMS, AND REGISTER THEIR INTENTION TO CON-
TRIBUTE ACTIVELY TO THE WORK OF THE UN SPECIAL SESSION
ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD). WE WOULD THINK THE ALLIES
SHOULD AIM FOR A MUCH BRIEFER STATEMENT OF CONCERN ABOUT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BELGRADE 7613

THE ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT, PERHAPS FOLLOWED BY A
SHORT LIST OF GENERAL RESOLVES ABOUT BEHAVIOR WHICH
COULD CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING MILITARY CONFRONTATION,
AS IS DONE IN THE CANAKXAN DRAFT RESOLUTION ON DISI
ARMAMENT WHICH HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN NATO POLADS (REF
B). WE NOTE DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL OF SUBSTANCE OF

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CANADIAN TEXT (REF C) AND WILL OFFER OUR RECOMMENDATIONS LATER ABOUT HOW IT MIGHT BE USED IN NEGOTIATING LANGUAGE OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT.

B. THE FAVORABLE REFERENCE IN THE ROMANIAN DRAFT TO THE SSOD HAS BEEN ECHOED BY YUGOSLAVS IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY BASKET I. YUGOSLAV HAVE TOLD CANADIANS THEY ARE DETERMINED TO SEE SOME SUCH LANGUAGE IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. WE PRESUME DEPARTMENT PERCEIVES NO OBJECTION TO THIS.

C. BEYOND ITS LENGTH AND LACK OF FOCUS WE SEE CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN LANGUAGE OF SECTION I: PHRASE "EXHORBITANT SUMS" IN DESCRIBING MILITARY SPENDING; UNQUALIFIED ASSERTION THAT THERE HAS BEEN A "LACK OF PROGRESS" IN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS; AND ASSIGNMENT OF SPECIAL PRIORITY TO "NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT".

5. SECTION II, NOTIFICATION AND RESTRICTIONS.

A. PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE. WHEN NATURE OF CONCLUDING DOCUMENT BECOMES CLEARER, ALLIES WILL PROBABLY WISH TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE, WHICH WAS LEFT OUT OF DRAFT PRESENTED BY NORWAY AND OTHER CO-SPONSORS NOVEMBER 2. ROMANIAN LANGUAGE HAS SIGNIFICANT GAPS: IT MAKES NO REFERENCE TO EXPERIENCE GAINED WITH CBMS TO DATE, FINAL ACT LANGUAGE ABOUT "DEVELOPING AND ENLARGING" CBMS, OR MIXED EXPERIENCE (OR ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT) IN IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCRETIONARY MEASURES.

B. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS. NOTIFICATION AREA IS SPECIFIED AS "TERRITORY, IN EUROPE" OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME IT IS STIPULATED THAT NOTIFICATION IS TO BE GIVEN "IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT CONCERNING THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES. . . ." THIS LEAVES IT UNCLEAR, PROBABLY INTENTIONALLY,
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WHETHER ALL SOVIET TERRITORY WEST OF URALS IS TO BE INCLUDED OR ONLY ZONE 250 KILOMETERS DEEP, AS IN CASE OF MAJOR MANEUVERS. AS FORMULATED, PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF READINESS EXERCISES IF ABOVE THRESHOLD SIZE. INFORMATION REQUIRED IN NOTIFICATIONS INCLUDES CERTAIN ELEMENTS EITHER DROPPED FROM ORIGINAL US OPTIONS, IN INTEREST OF GREATER SIMPLICITY, DURING DISCUSSIONS IN POLADS (I.E., "MEANS OF TRANSPORT") OR NOT INCLUDED IN THEM ("ITINERARY OF THE

MOVEMENT"). REQUIREMENT TO REPORT "WEAPONS" WOULD OBVIOUSLY NEED MORE SPECIFIC DEFINITION. WE WOULD SEE NO PROBLEM ACCEPTING THESE ADDITONS IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING A MOVEMENTS TEXT.

C. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. THIS WAS INCLUDED IN PROPOSAL ON CBMS PRESENTED BY NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED GROUP IN 1974 AND WAS REJECTED BY US AND OTHER ALLIES AS WELL AS BY THE SOVIET UNION. NATO DOCUMENT ON PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE C-M(77)61 DOES NOT ADDRESS THIS PROPOSAL DIRECTLY, BUT MILITARY COMMITTEE HAS REAFFIRMED ITS EARLIER OBJECTIONS TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR OR NAVAL MANEUVERS UNLESS RESTRICTED IN A WAY WHICH WOULD MAKE PROPOSAL BLATANTLY ONE-SIDED (I.E., LIMITED IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE BLACK SEA AND THE BALTIC, EXEMPTING THE MEDITERRANEAN). QUESTION THEN IS NOT WHETHER ROMANIAN PROPOSAL OR EVEN MODIFIED VERSION OF IT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT RATHER WHAT ARGUMENTS TO USE IN REJECTING IT. LAST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION IN FINAL ACT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS PROVIDES FOR DISCRETIONARY NOTIFICATION OF "OTHER MILITARY MANEUVERS", I.E., THOSE OTHER THAN THE MAJOR AND SMALLER-SCALE GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS DISCUSSED IN THE PRECEEDING PARAGRAPHS. ARGUMENT, THEREFORE, CANNOT BE MADE THAT TO INTRODUCE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS WOULD BE TO BRING ENTIRELY NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE REGIME OF CBMS. REVIEWING THE EUR/IG WORKING PAPER ON AIR AND NAVAL

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MANEUVERS, THE ONLY USABLE SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS, WHICH
WE HAVE ELABORATED SOMEWHAT, WOULD SEEM TO BE:

-- THAT AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS ARE DIFFICULT
TO DEFINE AND BOUND: A GIVEN EXERCISE MAY BEGIN OR END
IN THE CSCE AREA BUT EXTEND FAR BEYOND; EVERY LAUNCH
OF AIRCRAFT FROM A CARRIER OR A GROUND BASE COULD
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BE CONSIDERED A MANEUVER REQUIRING NOTIFICATION; TO
DEVELOP DETAILED PARAMETERS TO DEAL WITH SUCH DEFINITIONAL
PROBLEMS, IF POSSIBLE AT ALL, WOULD BE A COMPLEX
TASK FAR BEYOND THE TIME OR TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF BELGRADE.

-- TO TEST READINESS, NAVAL FORCES AT SEA ROUTINELY
CONDUCT EXERCISES ON SHORT NOTICE; THIS IS
NECESSARY FOR DEFENSIVE PREPAREDNESS; A REQUIREMENT
FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION WOULD INTERFERE WITH THIS LEGITI-
MATE ACTIVITY.

-- AN OBLIGATION TO PRE-NOTIFY NAVAL MANEUVERS
WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
ON THE HIGH SEAS.

WE WOULD HOPE TO DEAL WITH THIS ELEMENT OF THE
ROMANIAN PROPOSAL BY ARGUING THAT IT WAS FULLY
EXPLORED AND REJECTED AT GENEVA AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
TO OCCUPY THE LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE FOR NEGOTIATION
OF STRENGTHENED CBMS AT BELGRADE. FOR USE AS NECESSARY
IN MORE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, WE WOULD
APPRECIATE ANY ELABORATION DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE OF

POINTS OUTLINED ABOVE.

D. RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN KINDS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY (NO MULTINATIONAL MILITARY MANEUVERS IN FRONTIER AREAS, NO NEW MILITARY BASES, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS SITES, AND NO INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF TROOPS STATIONED ON THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES IN EUROPE). CONCEPTUALLY AND PRACTICALLY THESE PROPOSALS FALL OUTSIDE WHAT CAN SERIOUSLY BE ADDRESSED AT BELGRADE. AT THE SAME TIME, UNLIKE SOVIET PROPOSALS ON NON-FIRST-USE, FREEZING OF MEMBERSHIP OF PACTS, AND LIMITING MANEUVER SIZE, THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE DESIGNED TO BENEFIT OR INHIBIT ONE ALLIANCE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER. THEY HAVE THE INGENUOUS APPEAL OF MEASURES WHICH, IN THE ABSTRACT, COULD CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY AND INHIBIT THE

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USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL ENDS. IN DISCUSSING THEM, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THIS AND ACKNOWLEDGE THE LEGITIMACY OF ROMANIA'S CONCERN ABOUT THE PARTICULAR ISSUES THEY ADDRESS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME FIRMLY ARGUING THAT THEY ARE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR NEGOTIATION AT BELGRADE. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THAT ARGUMENT WOULD BE:

- THESE MEASURES WOULD GO FAR BEYOND THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, IN THAT THEY WOULD RESTRICT WHAT STATES MAY DO RATHER THAN SIMPLY OBLIGING THEM TO CONDUCT CERTAIN OF THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES MORE OPENLY.

- SUCH RESTRICTIONS CAN BE ADDRESSED MEANINGFULLY ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT ELIMINATING THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF MILITARY INSTABILITY IN EUROPE -- THE SERIOUS IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- OR ONCE THIS SOURCE OF INSTABILITY HAS BEEN ELIMINATED.

- IN THE MEANTIME THE NATO COUNTRIES, WHO ARE JOINED IN A PURELY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE, CANNOT ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ON THEIR FREEDOM TO TAKE MEASURES NECESSARY TO ASSURE THEIR DEFENSE.

- THIS INCLUDES THE FREEDOM JOINTLY TO EXERCISE THEIR FORCES WHEREVER REQUIRED TO ASSURE THEIR DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND, SIMILARLY, TO DEPLOY THEIR WEAPONS AND FORCES IN WHATEVER MANNER AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE POSTURE MAY DEMAND.

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